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1. #SERVER 2016 REMOTE DESKTOP SERVICES DISABLE PASSWORD UPDATE#
2. #SERVER 2016 REMOTE DESKTOP SERVICES DISABLE PASSWORD SKIN#

You can also disable SMBv1 globally using GPO:Īlso, forcing the signature of SMB connections will help against responder-type attacks: You might want to scan for hosts that still support SMBv1 and mitigate those ( ).

#SERVER 2016 REMOTE DESKTOP SERVICES DISABLE PASSWORD SKIN#

Mimikatz and Microsoft are in an ongoing game of "cat and mouse" over this issue, and newer versions of Mimikatz have newer attacks.Īs with everything, if you have SMBv1 or unsigned connections enabled, there are easier ways to skin the AD credential cat than to use Mimikatz - namely just use responder if you happen to have a host on the inside network: However, what you'll find is that these protections only protect against the initial vector. (again, this is not required unless you still have Windows 7 or XP) HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest

#SERVER 2016 REMOTE DESKTOP SERVICES DISABLE PASSWORD UPDATE#

You still need to update a registry key to disable this behaviour: Unfortunately, even after applying this patch credentials are still stored in memory. Since then, this protection has been integrated into Windows 8.x, Windows 10 and Server 2016+. Also sadly, it's been pretty easy to bypass AV on this for some time now - there are a number of well-known bypasses that penetration testers use for the Mimikatz + AV combo, many of them outlined on the BHIS blog: īut what about standard Windows mitigations against Mimikatz? Let's start from the beginnning, when Mimikatz first came out, Microsoft patched against that first version of code using KBKB2871997 (for Windows 7 era hosts, way back in 2014). The Emotet strain of malware for instance does exactly this, once it gains credentials and persistence it often passes control to other malware (such as TrickBot or Ryuk). Sadly, this is half right - malware does use this style of attack. The defender / blue-teamer (or the blue-team's manager) will often say "this sounds like malware, isnt't that what Antivirus is?". An attacker can then use these credentials to "pivot" to attack other resources in the network - this is commonly called "lateral movement", though in many cases you're actually walking "up the tree" to ever-more-valuable targets in the infrastructure.

Mimikatz parses credentials (either clear-text or hashes) out of the LSASS process, or at least that's where it started - since it's original version back in the day, it has expanded to cover several different attack vectors. If you are like me, at some point in most penetration tests you'll have a session on a Windows host, and you'll have an opportunity to dump Windows credentials from that host, usually using Mimikatz.